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 During the initial quarter-century of the post-World War II era, the development 
strategies urged on less-developed countries by the economic think tanks and foreign aid 
agencies of the capitalist world were shaped by Keynesian macroeconomics and by two 
“lessons” from history that further enlarged the economic role assigned the state in the 
development process. During the second post-war quarter century, the mainstream 
perspective shifted to neo-liberalism, which reoriented macroeconomic policy to accord 
with monetarism, structural policies with competitive general equilibrium theorizing, and 
reinforced the reorientation with “lessons” from history that diminished the role of the 
state in the development process.  Recently, however, we have been witnessing growing 
defections from neo-liberalism at the ideational level and tectonic shifts away at the 
political level.  Optimistically, these trends will return capitalistic development strategies 
and their theoretical rationale, in spirit though not in detail, back to those of the initial 
post-war quarter century; pessimistically, not before passing again through a 1930s-type 
dark tunnel.   
I. The Evolution from Dirigiste to Neo-liberal Development Strategies 
 What Keynesian theory brought to dirigiste development strategizing was the 
inference that aggregate output and employment paths of market economies sans 
government guidance are inherently unstable.  That inference was further supported by 
the global financial chaos of the interwar decades, which graphically demonstrated that 
private financial markets are inherently too unstable to be allowed full freedom of 
                                                 
°My deep appreciation to the Weidenbaum Center of Washington University for financial support, and to 
doctoral student Jose Ricardo da Costa e Silva, for help in data collecting, table preparation and other 
invaluable assistance.   
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action.1  Interest, exchange, and capital controls and subsidies—“financial repression”--
were therefore acceptable tools for stabilizing fragile developing economies and 
facilitating the funding of priority development projects as they struggled to catch up 
with the developed world. 
Internationally, this “lesson” plus Keynesian theory also shaped the Bretton 
Woods Articles of Agreement, which established the World Bank to supply long-term 
project loans to both war-ravaged and to less-developed countries, and the International 
Monetary Fund to help implement and protect the pegged exchange rate system called for 
in the Articles.  These required all currencies to be convertible for current account 
transactions, but sanctified controls of capital account transactions.  The U.S. dollar was 
to be pegged to gold, and the other currencies to be pegged to the dollar.  The IMF was to 
supply short-term credits to help countries defend currency convertibility, and to keep the 
convertible exchange rate system compatible with domestic full employment by 
coordinating the macroeconomic policies of deficit and surplus countries.  In practice, 
World Bank and IMF credits were dominated by governmental foreign aid flows that 
were guided mainly by U.S. Cold War objectives.  But both institutions rose in 
importance in the succeeding neo-liberal era, although with new functions that deviated 
from the Articles of Agreement.  The Articles are still its de jure charter, but the IMF 
now “honors them more in the breach than in the observance.”  
The second “lesson,” drawn from 19th century economic history, was that 
industrialization is the primary engine of economic development, but revving it up 
required more extensive state action of later industrializing countries than of early 
                                                 
1 To quote from Ragnar Nurkse’s canonical study of the period:   
“If there is anything that inter-war experience has clearly demonstrated, it is that paper currency 
exchanges cannot be left to fluctuate from day to day under the influence of market supply and 
demand….If currencies are left free to fluctuate, speculation in the widest sense is likely to play havoc with 
exchange rates—speculation not only in foreign exchanges but also as a result, in commodities entering 
into foreign trade.” [Nurkse, 1944, pp.137-38]. 
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industrializers to build up supportive infrastructure and to offset barriers to investment 
and its appropriate allocation.  “Industrial policy” and “picking winners” were 
permissible components of strategies for industrializing the less-developed countries of 
the post-WW II era. 
The neo-liberal approach, on the other hand, takes off from the conviction that 
general competitive equilibrium theorizing firmly establishes that competitive market 
forces can bring real world capitalist economies to optimal output and employment 
growth paths that maximize the welfare potential of the stocks of productive forces 
employed.  The chief cause of the unstable output and employment levels observable in 
the real world are “exogenous shocks”--unpredictable events that require changing 
production plans, relative prices and quantities, and that may transitorily disrupt the 
system of interacting markets.  Such disruptive events are primarily “technology shocks,” 
i.e., the introduction of novel products and processes, and “policy surprises,” i.e., 
unanticipated government interventions in the operations of the private economy.  But 
governments can also retard longer term growth through tariffs, taxes and controls that 
more permanently distort private incentives and relative prices.  Differences in the 
reliance on such market distorting policy instruments account in large part for the 
differences in growth rates between countries.   
Development strategy should, therefore, focus on maximizing market efficiency 
by minimizing policy-induced distortions and surprises.  Shrinking the scope of the 
activist state would still leave it with essential functions. Thus inflation and deflation, 
which distort market perceptions and incentives, require “market friendly” collective 
action, i.e., “sound” fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize the price level.  “Soundness” 
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meant balancing the fiscal accounts and stabilizing the growth of the money stock.2  The 
state would also retain an essential role in enforcing contracts, protecting life and 
property, advancing education, and providing other basic public goods.  But overcoming 
the technological and capital accumulation shortfalls that had concerned the 
interventionist development strategies of the Bretton Woods era should be left to the 
market, by removing capital controls and other impediments to the free flow of foreign 
direct and portfolio capital. 
Supporting “lessons” from history?  Chief among these was that the pre-World 
War I gold standard demonstrated the viability as well as the virtues of free capital 
mobility.  Free of capital controls, long-term capital had flowed massively from 
industrialized Europe to the United States and other “regions of recent settlement” with 
independent currencies, while stabilizing short term financial flows substituted for gold 
flows in keeping the exchange rates of the creditor countries within their “gold points.”3  
Other “lessons” have been reversible.  The path of neo-liberalism through the developing 
countries soon became strewn with temporary successes that ended abruptly in systemic 
currency and banking crises.  Heralded initially by Washington, the IMF and Wall Street 
as exemplars “pour encourager les autres,” the stricken exemplars after their fall were 
transformed into examples of misapplications of the neo-liberal strategy to be avoided in 
the future. 
                                                 
2 When the key components of Friedman-type Monetarism—the demand for money function and the 
money multiplier--proved unstable, the emphasis shifted to targeting the price level, with the central bank 
manipulating the short-term interest rate as its main targeting instrument.   
 
3This is obviously a narrow assessment of a complicated era in which pro-cyclical unemployment, wage 
depression and emigration were also basic adjustment mechanisms in both the creditor and debtor 
countries, along with tariff increases in most of the industrialized countries; domestic financial crises were 
frequent phenomena; and many of the capital recipients, notably in Latin America, were unable to stay on 
the gold standard for long.  [Eichengreen 1996, Thomas 1954, 1972, Bloomfield 1959, Felix 2002].   
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Neither of the alternative approaches to development was, therefore, implemented 
uniformly and both produced mixed results.  But the events that led to the shift to neo-
liberalism differed qualitatively from the current crisis of neo-liberalism that threatens a 
return to dirigiste development strategies akin to those of the Bretton Woods era.  The 
earlier dirigiste approach gave way primarily because of political and ideological 
pressures; the neo-liberal approach is giving way, counter political and ideological 
pressures notwithstanding, because of its flawed economics. 
Dirigiste development was gradually undercut by the backwash from the crisis 
that terminated the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the early 1970s.  That crisis 
was fundamentally political.  There were economically feasible modifications of the 
Bretton Woods system that could have extended its workability, but they required 
collective agreements that proved politically unattainable.4  However, there was no 
concurrent economic crisis of dirigiste development.  Indeed, the 1960s decade climaxed 
a record high quarter-century of growth of both GDP and GDP per capita in all 
developing as well industrialized regions of the world [Maddison 2002, Table 3-1a].  The 
                                                 
4  Thus, the “Triffin Dilemma,” a key factor in the 1960s crisis, could have been avoided had the U.S. not 
rejected Keynes’ Clearing Union proposal for handling global liquidity problems and opted instead for the 
IMF with its more-limited and inflexible dollar-dominated credits as the global supplier of emergency 
liquidity.  Belgian economist Robert Triffin had pointed out  that this arrangement, combined with a dollar 
freely exchangeable for gold at a fixed price in intergovernmental transactions, rendered the Bretton Woods 
system dynamically unstable.  That is, the growth of world trade would require an increase in global 
reserves to finance trade and current account imbalances.  With the monetary gold stock more or less fixed, 
that increase would require the U.S. to run chronic balance of payments deficits.  But as it did so, its rising 
stock of foreign liabilities would soon overtake its gold stock, which would undermine the credibility of its 
commitment to exchange gold for dollars on demand at the agreed price of  $35 per ounce and threaten a 
self-feeding run on the U.S. gold stock.  Since the resources of the IMF were too meager to fill the liquidity   
gap, the U.S., to keep its commitment would have to pursue deflationary policies sufficient to halt the 
dollar drain.  But that would also shrink global liquidity and threaten a return to inter-war deflation and its 
dire economic repercussions.  Alternatively, Bretton Woods members could transform the IMF into a 
mechanism closer to Keynes’ Clearing Union. 
A 1960s proposal to allow the IMF to supplement member country reserves with Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) was intended to do that.  Applied expansively, it would have loosened the chains tying the 
dollar to gold, making it easier for the U.S. to devalue, and surplus countries to revalue, their exchange 
rates.   But that might also have weakened the international power that being the sole supplier of global 
reserves brought the U.S.   So it fought off the proposal for most of the 1960s before grudgingly agreeing to 
a token allocation of  SDRs at the end of the decade.  The mechanism has remained marginalized since. 
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uniquely fast growth was also unusually stable and equitable, leading Angus Maddison 
and others to dub the quarter-century “the Golden Age of Capitalism.”5   
The transition to neo-liberalism was mainly impelled by political and ideological 
changes external to the developing world. In the 1970s “foreign aid fatigue,” especially in 
the United States with its weakened balance of payments and war-induced inflation, plus 
the recycling of surplus OPEC country deposits into bank loans to upper-tier developing 
countries, initiated a major privatizing of “North to South” financial flows.  The OPEC 
price surge also slowed economic growth and accelerated inflation in the industrialized 
countries.  The stagflation helped monetarism and the new classical macroeconomics 
dethrone Keynesianism as the ruling orthodoxy among Anglo-American economists.  So 
also did the “magic” of the financial markets, as they rapidly exploited arbitraging 
opportunities, creating liquid markets for new financial instruments to hedge against the 
unexpected volatility of the newly floating exchange rates.  The efficient market and 
rational expectations hypotheses (EMH and Ratex) became centerpieces of the emerging 
neo-liberal orthodoxy, while also providing theoretical backing to the demands for 
decontrol from the financial sectors of the major industrial countries. 
Paradoxically, it was the first major financial failure of neo-liberalism, the early 
1980s debt crisis, that was most instrumental in forcing the new orthodoxy on the 
developing countries, for it brought in the IMF to oversee the rescue.  Sidelined during 
the recycling boom, the IMF was now assigned the task by the major creditor countries of 
coordinating a rescue effort that would keep the mainly Latin American debt crisis from 
exploding into a global banking crisis.  The fear was that some of the major international 
lending banks, having become badly overleveraged in their avidity to lend, were 
vulnerable to massive withdrawals of  inter-bank deposits, should one or more 
                                                 
5 The interval 1950-73 was also the only sustained period during which the interregional spread of GDP per 
capita narrowed rather than widened. [Maddison 2001, Table 3-1b].  
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overborrowed Latin American country default.  Withdrawals plus the fall in the market 
value of the defaulted loans could force the overleveraged banks into insolvency as well 
as illiquidity, with dire repercussions on other banks and their business customers around 
the world.  
In coordinating the rescue, the IMF therefore tied the bailout credits to priorities 
that deviated from those assigned it by its charter, the Bretton Woods Articles of 
Agreement.  Protecting private international creditors took top priority over stabilizing 
the debtor economies and minimizing employment and output losses.6  Large IMF, World 
Bank and IBRD loans to enable debtor governments to keep up debt servicing were made 
conditional on the creditor banks agreeing to renew maturing loans, and on debtors 
agreeing to raise interest rates, but not capital controls, to deter the ongoing capital flight, 
and to move toward primary fiscal surpluses sufficient to service the foreign bank debts.  
The latter had to include loans to private domestic banks and corporations that had been 
contracted without government guarantee.  The last condition, an ex post socializing of 
private debts, augmented the requisite primary fiscal surpluses, as did also repaying the 
bailout credits.  The rescue packages sustained debt servicing long enough to enable the 
overleveraged banks by the end of the decade to regain solvency and the confidence of 
the international financial centers.7  But the cost to the Latin American debtors was the 
“Lost Decade,” their first extended economic depression of the post-war.  
To rationalize the asymmetrical burden-sharing, the IMF and World Bank 
embarked on an extensive campaign to spread the neo-liberal message.  Their reports 
                                                 
6 During the Bretton Woods era currency and debt crises were more easily localized. Since most of the 
international lending was intergovernmental, the Paris Club, a consortium of creditor countries, would take 
charge of negotiating relief packages with the debtor governments   The IMF, to the extent it became 
involved, typically conditioned its credits on commitments by the debtor governments to  reduce domestic 
and external macroeconomic imbalances by policies that reduced reliance on quantity controls.     
7 Near the end of the decade the creditor banks felt strong enough to refuse to participate in new bailout 
packages.  The U.S. Treasury then intervened with the Brady Plan, which imposed a mild “haircut” on the 
banks  and collateralized their remaining loans outstanding with U.S. bonds. 
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blamed the debt crisis on various policy errors and omissions of the debtor governments 
that had misled the creditor banks to overlend; hailed the potential benefits to developing 
countries of opening up to foreign capital inflows; and urged the adoption of market-
liberalizing reforms to “get prices right,” and “sound” macroeconomic policies to regain 
the confidence of foreign lenders and investors.  Protecting the private foreign creditors, 
blaming crises on government failure, and conditioning its credits on “sound” 
macroeconomic policies and more market liberalizing reforms became the IMF’s 
standard approach to future currency and financial crises of developing countries.  Thus 
as the frequency of such crises rose, the IMF reacted to rescue failures by expanding its 
market-liberalizing and privatization demands in order to hasten the removal of the 
policies and structural inadequacies that it decided were still blocking the way to the Holy 
Grail, the transformation of developing countries into smooth functioning, fast growing 
and globally integrated free market economies.  Prior to 1975, the average number of 
conditions to which the IMF had tied its credits was less than four; during 1985-95 it rose 
to twelve [Gould 2003; Figure 1]. 
The IMF view of its role in sustaining financial globalization also soared.  During 
the tequila crisis, Michel Camdessus, then Managing Director of the IMF, pronounced 
that “In today’s globalized markets, we must ensure that our ability to react approaches 
the instant decision making of investors if we want to have the ability to give confidence 
to markets and our members.”[IMF Survey, June 19, 1995].8  Concurrently, the IMF and 
the U.S. proposed amending the Articles of Agreement by replacing embarrassing Article 
                                                 
8 Camdessus indicated what this entailed in a February 1995 interview on the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour.  
The chief objective of the $50 billion credit package given Mexico was not to prevent default, he asserted, 
but to keep  Mexico from using capital controls to halt the run on its dollar reserves by foreign and 
domestic holders cashing in their peso-denominated, exchange rate-indexed tesebonos for dollars. 
Contractually, Mexico was merely obligated to remunerate holders of these treasury notes in exchange-rate 
adjusted quantities of pesos. It could therefore have curbed much of  the dollar drain by closing the Banco 
de Mexico’s dollar window to the peso recipients.  But, as Camdessus pointed out, were Mexico successful 
in solving its currency crisis this way, it would set a bad example to other developing countries in similar 
financial distress, which might reverse the progress toward globalizing free capital mobility. 
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VI, which validated the use of capital controls by member states and authorized the IMF 
to suspend credits to members when used to finance capital flight, with a new article that 
made eliminating capital controls a condition of membership in good standing.  The 
proposal was to be submitted to the September 1997 meeting of IMF members.  But with 
the Asian crisis then in full contagion, the proposal was quietly shelved.      
But while the push to spread neo-liberalism as a development strategy has been 
fundamentally political, its current crisis is rooted in economic failures.  Chief among 
these is the accumulating evidence that the capstone of the neo-liberal strategy, 
liberalizing and globalizing capital markets, has not accelerated economic growth in the 
developing countries by more efficiently guiding their capital accumulation and 
technological progress.  On the contrary, it has been associated with slower and more 
unstable growth.  Moreover, the failure is likely to persist, because the neo-liberal case 
for capital market liberalization has also an extremely weak basis in economic theory, 
and growing awareness of this is undermining confidence in its policies at the IMF and 
other promoters of capital market liberalization.  How soon such policies themselves 
come to be modified to allow developing countries more macro-policy autonomy will be 
determined more by power and ideology than by economic analysis.  But the failure of 
the capstone of the neo-liberal strategy to deliver economically, should lead through 
domestic political reactions to a weakening of the heavy hand of the international capital 
markets over the macroeconomic policies of developing countries, which should make 
other dimensions of dirigiste development feasible again.  Sections II, III and IV expand 
on the evidence and the theoretical critique, while concluding section V discusses policy 
implications for developing countries. 
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II. The Pace of Development: Bretton Woods vs. the Neo-Liberal Decades.  
 
 Tables 1 and 2 document that, contrary to neo-liberal expectations, capital market 
decontrol and the resulting increase of market-driven international financial flows has 
been associated with a slow-down rather than a faster increase of national output.  Table 
1, which groups countries by region, shows that the falloff of GDP growth after the 
Bretton Woods quarter century affected all but one of the groups.  Among the 
industrialized groups, the decline ranged from -26% for the “Western Offshoots” 
(Maddison’s term for the U.S. and the British Dominions) to -69% for Japan.  Among 
developing countries, growth rates declined for all but the Asian group, with Africa 
falling-38% and Latin America -43% below their Bretton Woods era rates during 1973-
98.  The “World” decline of -39% includes the Soviet cum ex-Soviet countries.  They 
dropped, according to Maddison’s data, from an annual growth rate of 4.84% during 
1950-73, to -0.56% during 1973-98.  The negativity was because of the collapse of output 
during their great leaps forward to capitalism in the 1990s; earlier their declining growth 
was still positive.   
 
Table 1 
Annual GDP Growth Rates, 1950-98 
Regional Groups 1950-73    
(a) 
1973-98   
(b) 
%Change:        
(b)/(a) 
Western Europe  4.81 2.11 -56.8 
Western Offshootsa  4.03 2.98 -26.1 
Japan  9.29 2.97 -69 
Asia (excluding Japan) 5.18 5.46 5.4 
Latin America  5.33 3.02 -43.3 
Africa  4.45 2.74 -38.4 
Worldb 4.91 3.01 -38.7 
a The U.S. and British Dominions.    
b Includes the Soviet and ex-Soviet 
Countries.    
Source: Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Table 3-1a.   
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 Table 2 tests whether the Table 1 comparisons hide countering  trends and 
individual exceptions.  The data covers all non-Communist countries whose 1983 GDP 
exceeded US$10 billion in 1983 prices, and sorts out major oil exporters from the 
industrial and developing countries’ sub-sets.  The Table divides the post-Bretton Woods 
era into three decades and compares the GDP growth rate per decade of each country 
with its growth rate in 1960-71.  The latter period marked the institutional peak of the 
Bretton Woods exchange rate system.  The West European countries had terminated the 
European Payments Union, and beginning in 1959 their currencies were fully convertible 
for all current account transactions.9   Table 2 shows that the first post-Bretton Woods 
decade had the largest number of exceptions; 13 of the 53 countries had annual GDP 
growth rates that equaled or exceeded 1960-71.  But subtracting the oil exporters removes 
6 fast-growing developing countries, leaving only 7 of the remaining 44 developed and 
developing countries with 1972-81 growth rates that matched or exceeded their 1960-71 
rates.  The numbers shrink with each successive decade.  In 1992-2001 only 5 of the 53 
countries matched or exceeded 1960-71: three developing countries--none oil exporters—
and two industrial countries.  As regards growth, the Bretton Woods era ended on a high 
note; while the neoliberal era has been heading toward low B flat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We chose 1960 to begin our Bretton Woods yardstick in order to enlarge the developing country sub-set, 
for many of whom methodologically standardized GDP time series are available only from 1960 on.  
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Table  2 
Comparative GDP Growth per Decade: 1960 - 2001 
  
 Percent with Decadal Growth below their 1960 - 1971 Average 
  
Total Sample   
(n=53) 
Excluding Oil 
Exporters* 
Industrialized 
Countries** 
Developing 
Countries*** 
1972 - 1981 75.5 84.1 90.9 64.5 
1982 - 1991 88.7 88.6 100.0 80.6 
1992 - 2001' 90.6 88.6 95.5 87.1 
Sources:World Bank, World Development Indicators, various issues  
IMF,  International Financial Statistics, various issues    
OECD Economic Outlook # 73    
     
* Oil Exporters: Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, United Kingdom, Venezuela 
     
** Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan,  
    Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
     
*** Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., 
 Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Korea,  Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,  
 Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Syrian, Thailand, Turkey, 
Venezuela  
 
 Table 3 shows, unsurprisingly, that the annual growth of gross fixed investment 
also declined sharply after 1971.  More surprising, Table 3 shows that despite the 
intensified emphasis on trade liberalization in the neo-liberal era, the annual growth of 
merchandise exports has also declined.  Maddison, using the regional groupings of Table 
1 above, finds that the export growth rate in 1973-98 was substantially lower than in 
1950-73, both world wide, and in all his regions except Latin America [Maddison 2001, 
Table 3-2a].  The rising ratio of exports to GDP in Table 3 merely reflects that the GDP 
growth of the industrialized countries declined more than their export growth.  
Maddison’s data show that this was also the case world-wide and in all the developing 
regions except Africa, where export growth fell more than GDP growth in 1973-98 
[Maddison 2001, Tables 3-1a and 3-2b]. 
Table 4 shows that for the industrialized countries, the post-Bretton Woods 
growth of labor productivity of their business sectors has also fallen off sharply. 
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Comparable data are too sparse to extend the comparison to a representative sample of 
developing countries.  But Tables 5 to 9 below report financial trends from the post-
Bretton Woods era that imply that the causality runs from the financial globalization of 
the past two decades to the adverse real economy trends indicated by Tables 1 to 4.   
 
Table 3   
Growth of Real Investment and Exports, 1959 - 2002 
  G7 OECD World'' 
 (Percent) 
Annual Growth of Gross Fixed Investment    
1959 - 1971 6.1 6.0  
1972 - 1984 2.5 2.3  
1985 - 1997 3.6 3.9  
1998 - 2002' 2.6 2.5  
Annual Export Growth'''    
1959 - 1971 7.8 8.5 8.2 
1972 - 1984 6.2 6.3 4.6 
1985 - 1997 6.6 6.7 6.8 
1998 - 2002' 2.8 3.8 5.1 
Ratio of Export Growth to GDP Growth    
1959 - 1971 1.7 1.8  
1972 - 1984 2.1 2.3  
1985 - 1997 2.5 2.5  
1998 - 2002' 0.5 1.4   
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues   
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues  
' 2002 is an estimation    
" World exports are deflated by IMF's unit export prices.  
''' Data for G7 and OECD are GDP weighted averages.  
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Table 4  
Labor Productivity Growth of the Business Sector of the OECD 
Countries: 1960 - 2002 
  G7  Other OECD All OECD 
 (Percent) 
Annual Averages    
1960 - 1973 4.5 5.0 4.6 
1973 - 1979 1.6 3.1 1.8 
1979 - 1997 1.4 2.6 1.6 
1998 - 2002' 1.5 3.2 1.6 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, various years   
' 2002 is a preliminary estimation   
GDP weighted averages   
 
 
 
III. Causal links from Financial Liberalization to Slower Growth 
 
A. Increased Volatility and Misalignments of Real Exchange Rates 
 
Table 5 data contradict a basic tenet of neo-liberalism: that a regime of floating 
exchange rates and free capital mobility would enable nominal exchange rate movements 
to stabilize real exchange rates.  Movements of the nominal rates should eliminate 
temporary disequilibria in the pricing of goods in different currencies, with arbitraging 
currency speculators speeding up the adjustment, and thus helping to keep international 
traders and investors supplied with the correct set of real prices on which to base their 
decisions.  Large longer-term fluctuations of real exchange rates, on the other hand, 
reflect misaligned real exchange rates, that are generally caused by policies that hinder 
nominal exchange movements and capital mobility.  In the past two decades nominal 
exchange rate volatility indeed increased over the already volatile 1970s, and capital 
decontrol spread around the globe, allowing daily global foreign exchange transactions to 
shoot up from around $18 billion in 1977 to $1.5 trillion in 1998.  But as Table 5 shows, 
annual movements of the real exchange rates, already substantial in the 1970s, rose 
moderately higher in most of the industrialized countries after 1980, and more 
substantially in most of the developing countries.   
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Underlying this global financial churning are problematic global trends, most 
beginning in the mid-1970s to early 1980s.  These are a sustained rise of real long-term 
interest rates, a rising share of economic resources drawn into financial activities, an 
income distribution trend in the industrialized countries favoring rentier income at the 
expense of wage income, slower GDP growth, and a sustained upsurge in the rate of debt 
accumulation--mostly household and business debt.   
Table 5 
Inter-Decade Comparison of the Annual Volatility of  Real Exchange Rates: 1970 - 1980 = 100 
(Trade Weighted Indices) 
  1970 - 80 1981 - 91 1992 -2002 
  Mean Range* Coef Var** Mean Range* Coef Var** Mean Range* Coef Var** 
Industrialized 
Countries 100 0.2148 0.0703 104.51 0.2113 0.0720 107.45 0.1892 0.0639
          
U.S. 100 0.2320 0.0773 108.39 0.3045 0.1070 106.91 0.2195 0.0841
          
Japan 100 0.2220 0.0690 105.76 0.3107 0.0999 113.56 0.2729 0.0939
          
Euro Countries 100 0.2093 0.0738 94.59 0.2540 0.0929 96.37 0.2259 0.0735
          
Other OECD 100 0.2124 0.0691 105.11 0.1819 0.0615 108.13 0.1704 0.0565
          
Developing 
Countries 100 0.4327 0.1470 98.18 0.5510 0.1988 87.60 0.3201 0.1020
          
Asian 10 100 0.3413 0.1173 91.22 0.3952 0.1493 76.04 0.2450 0.0826
          
Lat. Am. 8 100 0.3141 0.0991 93.82 0.6964 0.2411 96.66 0.3726 0.1175
          
Mideast/African 6 100 0.7433 0.2604 115.58 0.6168 0.2248 94.79 0.3754 0.1136
Source:Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Markets, various issues    
          
* Difference between the highest and lowest values in the period, divided by the mean.    
** Standard deviation divided by the 
mean.        
Euro uses a synthetic Euro spot exchange rate, for pre-Euro years      
Other OECD= Australia, Canada, Denamark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.   
Asian 10 = Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand  
Latin America 8 = Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela    
Mideast/African 6 = Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey    
Ind. Countries = US, Canada, Japan, Austria, New Zealand, Euro, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK.  
Developing Countries = Latin America 8, Asian 10, and Mideast/African 6     
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B. Higher Real Long Term Interest Rates 
Table 6 contrasts the interest rate/growth rate relationship for the G-7, pre- and 
post- the early 1980s, using the credit risk-free 10 year government bond rate of each G-7 
to index its real long-term interest rates.  Note that during the peak Bretton Woods 
period, 1959-71, the real 10-year interest rate of each G-7 was comfortably positive, 
averaging 2.6% for the group [Felix 1998, Table 7].  Yet it fell short of the GDP growth 
rate of each country by a substantial margin.  The margin shrank in 1972-84, but 
remained negative in all except Germany during the inflationary OPEC-boom years, 
since despite the decline of GDP growth in each of the seven, their real interest rates also 
fell, averaging negative in three of the countries [Felix 1998; Tables 2 and 7].  The abrupt 
shift to positive margins during 1985-2002, on the other hand, is due primarily to sharply 
higher real interest rates, with further GDP growth retardation a minor contributor except 
in Japan. 
Table 6 
Real Interest Rate on 10 Year Governments Minus the Real GDP Growth Rate* 
  Canada France Germany Italy Japan**
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States G-7*** 
1881 - 1913        0.97 
1919 - 1939        2.40 
1946 - 1958        0.36 
1959 - 1971 -1.98 -4.29 -2.01 -3.40 -8.56 -0.38 -1.96 -3.23 
1972 - 1984 -1.65 -1.87 1.54 -4.92 -2.76 -1.58 -0.44 -1.67 
1985 - 1997 3.74 3.56 0.89 2.99 0.21 1.88 1.82 2.15 
1998 - 2002 2.61 3.03 1.26 3.30 1.51 1.61 1.22 2.08 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues     
               Pre-1959 data from Bordo (1993, Table 1)      
* Nominal rates deflated by the GDP deflator after 1958 and by CPI pre-
1959.    
** Data begin in 1965        
*** Unweighted average.        
 
Why the upsurge of real long-term interest rates?  A common explanation is that 
lenders, reacting belatedly to the higher inflation of the OPEC period, have been 
incorporating a higher inflation premium in their offer prices.  The trouble with this 
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explanation is that G-7 inflation peaked in the early 1980s and has been declining since, 
into deflationary territory in the case of Japan, yet real long-term rates have maintained 
their positive margins over GDP growth rates.   
The alternative explanation uses the fact that the upsurge of real long-term rates 
coincides with the approximate date when capital decontrol had encompassed enough 
major industrial countries to allow the formation and rapid expansion of an international 
market in long and short-term debt instruments.  This severely weakened the power of 
central banks to influence long-term rates; they could still anchor the short end of the 
yield curve, but the slope depended much more than before on market reactions to the 
central bank’s move.  Before, when the central bank lowered the short end, bond holders 
could only express their inflation phobia by moving down the yield curve to shorter 
maturities.  But this was self-limiting, since it would soon depress those yields to 
unappealingly low levels.  Decontrol opened up another escape channel--to foreign debt 
instruments with higher interest rates and favorable exchange rate prospects.  Over the 
next two decades international transactions in debt instruments rose explosively.  
What provided the surging demand for loanable funds needed to keep up real 
yields internationally by matching the explosive outflows?  Not the growth of real 
aggregate demand or real investment; both slowed globally (See Tables 1-3).  And not 
rising deficit financing; during 1983-2000 aggregate fiscal deficits of the OECD 
countries declined as a percent of GDP [Economist August 23, 2003; p.56].  Rather, the 
slower growing financing needs of real investment and fiscal deficits were offset by more 
rapidly growing demand for consumption financing (housing, consumer durables, etc.), 
funding of mergers and acquisitions, venture capital acquisitions, initial public offerings, 
and other financial underpinnings of the global equity price bubble and expanding flows 
during the 1990s to “emerging market” countries, both peaking at the end of the 1990s,. 
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Thus, by weakening the ability of central banks to influence the slope of the yield 
curve, capital decontrol has imposed two types of costs on the real economies of the 
financially liberalized economies.  During the prolonged equity price and lending 
bubbles, high real long-term interest rates helped depress the growth of real investment.10   
And the aftermath of the recent collapse has been a massive debt overhang which is 
further depressing private investment and demand for labor, as over-indebted firms and 
households struggle to make payments and rebuild their balance sheets, with lenders 
reacting to their accumulating carteras vencidas by becoming more risk averse.11  But the 
stimulating effect of lowering the short end of the yield curve is still being thwarted by 
bond market reactions that tilt the slope.  In Table 6, real long-term interest rates of all 
the G-7 have continued to exceed their real GDP growth rates, despite the collapse of the 
bubbles, outright deflation in Japan and further diminution of inflation in the other six 
countries.  Indeed, Table 6 suggests the current situation resembles not the pre-WWI 
Gold Standard era with its secularly rising prices, but the depressed interwar era with its 
secularly declining prices.  Deflation helped make the large debt overhangs of the 1930s 
unserviceable, a “lesson from history” that must haunt Chairman Greenspan of the U.S. 
Fed, as he runs out of room to lower further his weak policy instrument, the short-run 
rate.    
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The high real interest rates may have also contributed to the misallocation of investment by raising the 
“hurdle rate” less for investing in higher risk-higher expected returns projects than for lower return-lower 
risk projects.  This may help account for the high concentration currently of structural excess capacity in 
“New Economy” facilities and consumer durables plants.  
 
11 The IMF’s recent Global Financial Stability Report is concerned that lenders of the major financial 
centers have become too risk averse. Viz: “…as this report went to press, the main sources of risk to global 
financial stability seemed to be associated with a further significant and excessive cutback in risk taking in 
financial markets and in lending to less creditworthy borrowers, including in emerging markets, which 
could have potential implications for the global economy.”[IMF December, 2002; p.7] 
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C. Rising Resource Absorption in Financial Activities and Rising Rentier 
 Shares of National Income 
 
From the 1950s through the 1990s the gross value added of Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate activities (FIRE) rose nearly monotonically as a share of GDP, in each of 
the G-7 countries [Felix 1998; Figures 1-7]. The share of finance proper in the labor force 
of the OECD countries averaged 21% higher, and its share of total OECD investment 
104% higher in 1980-93 than in 1970-79 [Edey amd Hviding 1995; Table 2].  After 1975, 
finance was also the fastest-growing component of international trade in services, rising 
at 13% per annum, while investment in financial facilities was the largest component of 
FDI in services during the 1980s [OECD 1994].   
However, the relationship between FIRE and the non-financial components of 
GDP appears to be non-linear.  After the mid-1970s the rising trend of their FIRE shares 
associate with declining real growth rates of non-financial activities in each of the G-7.12  
The welfare implication of the non-linearity is striking.  The welfare contributions of 
non-financial activities are direct; they produce the goods and services which supply 
consumption and productive capacity.  The welfare contributions of FIRE activities are 
indirect; they facilitate and govern the allocation and distribution of non-financial goods 
and services currently and over time.  The adverse relationship between the growth of 
Fire and non-Fire activities after 1975 implies that the progressive liberation of FIRE 
activities after the mid-1970s enabled them to draw resources from non-financial 
activities to the detriment of economic welfare.  
As for income shares, these took a great leap upward during the two “Bubble 
Economy” decades. A recent study that extensively mined OECD national income and 
                                                 
12 I have not had time to extend these charts for this paper, but the sketchy financial and employment data 
suggest that FIRE share probably peaked around 2000, and has been declining since, perhaps faster than the 
declining growth of non-financial activities.   
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financial data, extracted the following findings for 13 industrialized OECD countries 
[Epstein and Powers 2003: Table 1].  In 10 of the 13 countries, the average rentier share 
of national income in 1980-2000 was higher than for 1960-1980.13  The mean increase 
for the ten countries was 77.9% and the median increase 80.5%.  The study provides data 
on the capital shares of the non-financial private sector of 11 of the 13 countries for the 
same two periods.  Their average share merely rose 9.5%, and the median share 17.2%, 
with decreased shares in 4 of the 11 countries.  Combined, however, the national capital 
shares of 9 of the 11 countries averaged higher in 1980-2000 than in 1960-1980, which 
means decreased labor shares of national income, a result consistent, the study points out, 
with the findings of other labor income studies. 
D. External Capital Flows and Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 
1970-2002 
 
Table 7 presents annual debt flow data, i.e., interest-bearing loans, to the 
developing and the Soviet cum ex-Soviet countries from 1970 to 2002, while Table 8 
adds non-debt inflows—foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows—and 
puts the combined data in a balance of payments format.  The debt data combine official 
with private flows, with all data deflated to 2002 U.S. dollars to get a better handle on net 
resource flows.  To save space, the annual flows are presented only in 10 year intervals, 
plus the latest available post-Bubble Economy year, 2002. 
The combined data for all the Table 7 regions show two gross debt inflow cycles, 
one peaking around 1980, the second around 2000 (actually, 1998) circling a flat trend.  
Deduct repayments of principal, however, and the net inflows decline sharply after 1980 
to around zero by 2000. Subtract rising interest payments on debt and the net resource 
transfers become increasingly negative from 1990 on.  The last is only partly offset by 
                                                 
13 Rentier income is defined in the study as the net profits of firms engaged primarily in financial market 
activities plus net interest income received by the rest of the private economy.  Capital gains were excluded 
from the calculations of Table 1 because of inadequate data.   
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equity inflows—FDI and portfolio equity inflows—which cycled upward after 1980 and 
peaked around 2000 before declining.  As Table 8 shows, net flows on capital account 
have remained positive to date, but rising current account outflows--profit remittances 
and interest payments--have overtaken net capital account inflows, so that net overall 
resource transfers also became negative by the end of the 1990s. 
 The regional data present a more diverse picture.  Latin America, East Asia and 
the ex-Soviet bloc—have largely determined the overall trends, receiving around 81% of 
the Gross Debt inflows and 91% of the net equity inflows, with Latin America numero 
uno, receiving 38% of all debt inflows and 36% of all equity inflows.14  But the post-
Bubble data show Latin America also to be the most vulnerable of the three major 
recipients.  Since 2000, it has been the focus of almost all the decline of gross debt and 
FDI inflow to developing countries, and its outward resource transfer leads the three by a 
wide margin.  The “Lost Decade” rides again?  The debt indicators in Table 9 suggest 
this possibility.  They show Latin America’s recent indicator values to be second only to 
those of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, whose need for debt relief is now axiomatic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Most of the regional results were determined by flows to a handful of countries.  A recent IMF study 
reports that flows to 22 developing countries accounted for almost all  the  private flows to developing 
countries: 7 are Latin American, 8 are East Asian, 2 are South Asian, 4 are Middle East and North Africa, 
and 1 is Sub-Saharan [Prasid et al. 2003; Appendix V]. 
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Table 7 
Annual External Debt Flows: 1970 - 2002 (selected years) 
 (2002 US$ million1/)  
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 
All Developing Countries.           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 49,384 269,513 186,466 267,014 247,844 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 24,431 186,303 74,168 -1,059 7,193 
  3. Interest Payments  -89,111 -86,409 -126,829 -102,701 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt***   97,191 -12,241 -127,979 -95,508 
East Asia and Pacific           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 6,032 31,376 48,349 31,108 48,820 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 3,678 23,093 24,255 -18,634 -8,282 
  3. Interest Payments  -9,338 -16,180 -26,144 -20,659 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt***   13,755 8,075 -44,778 -28,941 
Former Soviet Countries           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 4,120 40,164 28,226 77,319 71,183 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 1,893 26,224 2,976 22,817 11,165 
  3. Interest Payments  -10,456 -15,536 -24,232 -23,877 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt***   15,769 -12,560 -1,415 -12,711 
Latin America and the Caribbean           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 25,041 131,482 55,317 128,140 96,159 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 10,757 89,378 26,149 -1,134 3,509 
  3. Interest Payments  -47,733 -29,138 -56,703 -41,797 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt***   41,644 -2,988 -57,837 -38,288 
Middle East and North Africa           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 3,393 26,646 20,899 8,371 12,130 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 1,820 16,901 999 -6,767 -302 
  3. Interest Payments  -12,417 -10,879 -8,944 -7,738 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt***   4,484 -9,880 -15,711 -8,040 
South Asia           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 6,009 14,168 17,510 13,676 9,727 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 3,016 11,187 10,765 3,540 860 
  3. Interest Payments  -2,354 -7,882 -6,155 -4,863 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt***   8,832 2,883 -2,614 -4,003 
Sub-Saharan Africa           
  1. Gross Debt Inflow* 4,794 25,675 16,165 8,400 9,826 
  2. Net Debt Inflow** 3,271 19,520 9,022 -881 243 
  3. Interest Payments 0 -6,812 -6,794 -4,651 -3,768 
  4. Net Transfers on Debt*** 0 12,709 2,228 -5,623 -3,524 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance - CD-Rom 2003    
             US GDP deflator from IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues   
1/ Deflated by US GDP Deflator,       
* Long term plus short term private and official debt inflow    
**   Line 1 less repayment of principal      
*** Line 2 - line 3      
 23
The current debt indicator values of Table 9, in conjunction with the findings of a recent 
IMF study of the debt overhang problem, also shed additional light on the impact of 
financial globalization on the welfare of the developing countries and on current global 
financial fragility.  The IMF study [Patillo et al. 2002] working with 1969-98 external 
debt and GDP data from 93 developing countries obtained non-linear average 
relationships between external debt and GDP growth—Laffer-shaped  curves—that are 
quite similar to each other under different econometric techniques and conditioning 
variables.  The curves peak at debt/GDP and debt/export ratios well below any of the 
current regional values in Table 9, implying that all the regions are now on the 
descending half of the external debt/GDP growth curve.  More ominous is thefinding that 
the curves move into negative territory--meaning the debt level is depressing-the growth 
rate--when the debt/GDP ratio exceeds 35 to 40%, and the debt/export ratio exceeds 160 
to 170%.  Table 9 shows that the ex-Soviet countries, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa—now exceed that critical debt/GDP ratio, with the last two regions also exceeding 
the critical debt/export ratio. 
The IMF study imposes a full capacity growth condition on the econometrics, 
smoothing its annual data by 3-year and 10-year averaging.  Its working hypothesis is 
that over-indebtedness lowers economic growth by depressing the level of investment 
and its quality, but not the level of capacity utilization.  It thus avoids confronting the 
adverse Keynesian effects on GDP growth brought on by the volatility of capital inflows, 
and by the pro-cyclical fiscal-monetary policies forced on developing countries with 
large foreign-debt overhang debts by the “disciplining” of the capital markets and IMF 
bailouts.   
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Table 8  
Balance of Payment Impact of Capital Flows of Developing Regions, 1970 - 2002  
(selected years) 
 (2002 US$ million1/)  
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 
All Developing Countries. 
   Capital Account Inflows 32,836 196,500 110,811 192,159 159,553 
        Net Foreign Direct Investiment 8,411 10,200 30,828 166,298 143,000 
        Net Portfolio Equity Flows -8 -2 5,815 26,921 9,360 
     Total Non-Debt flows 8,403 10,198 36,643 193,219 152,360 
     Net Debt Flows 24,433 186,302 74,168 -1,059 7,193 
  Current Account Outflows -11,264 -126,664 -109,193 -204,150 -168,701 
      Net FDI profit remittance  -2,537 -37,553 -22,784 -77,320 -66,000 
      Interest Payments on Debt -8,727 -89,111 -86,409 -126,829 -102,701 
  Net Resource Transfers 21,572 69,836 1,618 -11,990 -9,148 
East Asia and Pacific 
   Capital Account Inflows 4,443 25,630 39,559 46,892 54,128 
        Net Foreign Direct Investiment 767 2,546 13,226 45,595 57,000 
        Net Portfolio Equity Flows -1 -8 2,078 19,931 5,410 
     Total Non-Debt flows 765 2,538 15,304 65,526 62,410 
     Net Debt Flows 3,678 23,092 24,255 -18,635 -8,282 
  Current Account Outflows -616 -12,586 -22,780 -58,653 -49,659 
      Net FDI profit remittance  0 -3,249 -6,599 -32,509 -29,000 
      Interest Payments on Debt -616 -9,338 -16,180 -26,144 -20,659 
  Net Resource Transfers 3,826 13,043 16,779 -11,761 4,469 
Former Soviet Countries 
   Capital Account Inflows 2,115 26,281 4,884 54,287 41,565 
        Net Foreign Direct Investiment 221 56 1,569 30,223 29,000 
        Net Portfolio Equity Flows 0 0 338 1,248 1,400 
     Total Non-Debt flows 221 56 1,907 31,470 30,400 
     Net Debt Flows 1,894 26,225 2,977 22,816 11,165 
  Current Account Outflows -565 -10,516 -15,815 -30,833 -29,877 
      Net FDI profit remittance  0 -60 -279 -6,601 -6,000 
      Interest Payments on Debt -565 -10,456 -15,536 -24,232 -23,877 
  Net Resource Transfers 1,550 15,765 -10,932 23,454 11,689 
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Table 8 – (cont) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
   Capital Account Inflows 15,258 101,789 39,863 76,912 46,509 
    Net Foreign Direct Investiment 4,501 12,412 10,458 78,437 42,000 
    Net Portfolio Equity Flows 0 0 3,255 -392 1,000 
   Total Non-Debt flows 4,501 12,412 13,714 78,045 43,000 
   Net Debt Flows 10,757 89,377 26,150 -1,133 3,509 
  Current Account Outflows --7,852 -57,997 -38,796 79,709 -60,797 
    Net FDI profit remittance  -2,537 -10,264 -9.658 23,005 -19,000 
    Interest Payments on Debt -5,315 -47,733 -29,138 56,703 -41,797 
  Net Resource Transfers 7,406 43,792 1,067 -2,797 -14,288 
Middle East and North Africa 
   Capital Account Inflows 2,795 11,475 4,599 -3,962 2,728 
    Net Foreign Direct Investiment 979 -5,427 3,594 2,555 3,000 
    Net Portfolio Equity Flows -2 0 6 250 30 
   Total Non-Debt flows 977 -5,427 3,600 2,805 3,030 
   Net Debt Flows 1,819 16,901 999 -6,767 -302 
  Current Account Outflows -387 -30,840 -14,376 -15,602 -12,718 
     Net FDI profit remittance  0 -18,422 -3,497 -6,658 -5,000 
     Interest Payments on Debt --387 -12,417 -10,879 -8,944 -7,738 
  Net Resource Transfers 2,408 -19,365 -9,777 -19,564 -10,010 
South Asia 
   Capital Account Inflows 3,277 11,563 11,592 8,452 6,660 
   Net Foreign Direct Investiment 260 377 693 3,198 5,000 
   Net Portfolio Equity Flows 1 0 135 1,713 800 
   Total Non-Debt flows 261 377 828 4,911 5,800 
   Net Debt Flows 3,016 11,186 10,765 3,541 860 
  Current Account Outflows -1,108 -2,420 8.,031 -7,400 -5,863 
     Net FDI profit remittance  0 -66 -149 -1,246 -1,000 
     Interest Payments on Debt -1,108 -2,354 -7,882 6,155 -4,863 
  Net Resource Transfers 2,169 9,143 3,561 1,051 797 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
   Capital Account Inflows 4,949 19,762 10,314 9,580 7,963 
    Net Foreign Direct Investiment 1,684 235 1,289 6,290 7,000 
    Net Portfolio Equity Flows -5 6 3 4,171 720 
   Total Non-Debt flows 1,678 241 1,291 10,461 7,720 
   Net Debt Flows 3,271 19,521 9,022 -881 243 
  Current Account Outflows -737 -12,304 -9,395 -11,953 -9,768 
     Net FDI profit remittance  0 -5,492 -2,601 -7,302 -6,000 
     Interest Payments on Debt -737 -6,812 -6,794 -4,651 -3,768 
  Net Resource Transfers 4,213 7,458 918 -2,373 -1,804 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance - CD-Rom 2003    
             US GDP deflator from IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues  
1/ Deflated by US GDP Deflator,       
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Table 9 shows that four of the regions—East Asia, the ex-Soviet countries, the Middle 
East and North Africa, and South Asia—have been trying to avoid that plight by building 
up their foreign exchange reserves at a fast pace.  This has meant accumulating U.S. 
treasury bills, which currently yield a meager 1% interest, as expensive and uncertain 
insurance against currency attacks and U.S. protectionist threats.  It is uncertain because 
the widening U.S. current account deficits now require foreigners to purchase a half-
trillion dollars per annum of dollar assets, else the U.S. would have to close the gap 
through dollar depreciation, tightened U.S. monetary-fiscal policies and slower growth.  
The reserve buildups of developing countries and Japan are now major bulwarks against 
these depressing alternatives. The Chinese and Japanese buildups, which this year are 
financing half the U.S. current account deficit, are also defenses against increasing U.S. 
pressure on those countries to appreciate their exchange rates or face US. protectionism.  
A number of dire global financial scenarios can be constructed from the conflicting 
behavior.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 An interesting one is that were China to succumb to U.S. demands to lift capital controls and let its 
exchange rate be market-determined, it would cause a  flight to the dollar by depositors in China’s shaky 
banks that would depreciate the yuan, while destabilizing China’s financial system and relative  exchange 
rates globally [Economist, September 6-12.2003; pp.13-14].  
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Table 9 
 External Debt Indicators of Developing Regions    (Percent) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 
All Developing Countries.         
   Total Debt over GNP 11.6 20.6 35.2 39.7 39.1 
   Total Debt over Exports 84.6 170.8 119.4 112.8 
   Debt Service over Exports 13.0 18.7 19.3 16.2 
   Interest paid over Exports 6.7 8.1 6.2 4.9 
   Short Term over Total Debt 23.3 16.3 14.2 14.5 
   Reserves over Total Debt 18.1 23.8 11.7 30.1 40.0 
East Asia and Pacific         
   Total Debt over GNP 30.2 16.2 35.5 31.8 28.7 
   Total Debt over Exports 190.0 135.2 77.2 71.2 
   Debt Service over Exports 26.7 17.8 11.4 10.9 
   Interest paid over Exports 14.2 7.2 3.9 2.9 
   Short Term over Total Debt 22.6 16.1 12.9 18.4 
   Reserves over Total Debt 21.6 23.3 26.0 55.6 77.2 
Former Soviet Countries         
   Total Debt over GNP 27.8 80.6 17.6 54.2 48.6 
   Total Debt over Exports 422.3 306.3 121.9 110.1 
   Debt Service over Exports 70.2 44.8 18.4 18.0 
   Interest paid over Exports 30.1 17.1 5.7 5.1 
   Short Term over Total Debt 22.6 18.2 16.0 13.9 
   Reserves over Total Debt 6.0 1.9 5.6 24.0 34.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean       
   Total Debt over GNP 20.3 35.8 44.6 40.9 48.2 
   Total Debt over Exports 201.6 254.5 168.4 173.6 
   Debt Service over Exports 36.3 24.4 38.6 29.6 
   Interest paid over Exports 19.3 12.2 11.8 9.2 
   Short Term over Total Debt 26.7 16.3 13.5 12.7 
   Reserves over Total Debt 13.3 15.0 9.9 19.9 20.4 
Middle East and North Africa         
   Total Debt over GNP 12.4 22.0 45.7 30.5 30.5 
   Total Debt over Exports 40.9 118.9 88.1 86.9 
   Debt Service over Exports 5.6 15.6 10.1 8.7 
   Interest paid over Exports 3.1 5.5 3.8 3.3 
   Short Term over Total Debt 25.3 24.1 23.0 23.6 
   Reserves over Total Debt 69.1 68.6 15.8 39.5 52.3 
South Asia           
   Total Debt over GNP 15.1 16.2 32.4 27.9 25.4 
   Total Debt over Exports 164.3 324.7 154.1 138.6 
   Debt Service over Exports 12.0 28.7 14.7 11.4 
   Interest paid over Exports 5.3 15.5 5.5 4.0 
   Short Term over Total Debt 6.5 9.6 3.6 3.4 
   Reserves over Total Debt 8.5 22.6 2.7 26.2 48.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa           
   Total Debt over GNP 11.4 23.5 63.1 68.8 65.0 
   Total Debt over Exports 65.4 208.6 175.2 164.5 
   Debt Service over Exports 7.2 12.8 11.2 10.7 
   Interest paid over Exports 3.8 6.3 3.7 3.0 
   Short Term over Total Debt 18.3 11.6 15.7 13.5 
   Reserves over Total Debt 32.3 23.5 7.4 16.4 17.8 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance - CD-Rom 2003  
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IV. The Current Theoretical and Policy Confusion at the IMF 
The IMF’s rationale for its conditionality demands of developing country 
supplicants has been that financial liberalization, privatization, and “sound” monetary-
fiscal policies opens the road to faster development by attracting more private foreign 
capital to supplement shortfalls in domestic savings, skills and technology.  Underpinning 
this rationale is the belief that financial markets are efficient processors of information 
and allocators of capital, hence pour in to fill such shortfalls.  When the funds showed a 
disturbing propensity to also pour out, it was facile for a time to blame that on policy 
surprises, lack of transparency and other information flaws of the recipient country that 
had misled the financial markets, and to add conditionality demands to the programs to 
reshape the economy and make it more appealing to the financial markets.16  Such 
conditions have imposed heavier adjustment costs on the debtor country, but the 
improved appeal to foreign investment was supposed to bring it greater offsetting benefits 
over the longer run.  
Confidence at the IMF in this general policy approach and its theoretical 
underpinnings is now flagging.  This shows up in critical reports by IMF economists, and 
in the rhetoric of top level IMF bureaucrats about the need for countries to “own” their 
adjustment programs, denials that the IMF takes a “one size fits all” approach to policy, 
and similar jargon.    
Thus IMF economists Ashoka Mody and Antu Murshid in a 2002 IMF Working 
Paper [“Growing Up with Capital Flows,” IMF Working Paper WP/02/75] tested the 
                                                 
16 The increases were labeled “structural adjustments” as distinct from mere quantitative targets.  “Whereas 
in the mid-1980s structural conditionality in IMF programs was rare, by the mid-1990s most programs 
included some structural conditions…the average number of structural conditions per program year 
increased from two in 1987 to more than 16 in 1997 [Bulir and Moon 2003; p.5]. 
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relationship between capital inflows and domestic investment on 1977-98 data from 60 
developing countries and report the following: 
“Our results suggest that the flush of capital inflows in the 1990s was more of a 
‘push’ into developing countries than a ‘pull’ based on a significant unmet demand for 
investment financing.  As a consequence, much of the new wave of inflows was diverted 
into alternative uses, a part of which (specifically the accumulation of reserves) was a 
direct consequence of the inflows.  However, a striking aspect of the 1990s experience 
was the large volume of capital outflows from the same countries that received 
significant inflows.  Thus the observed marginal relationship between capital inflows and 
domestic investment fell, even as countries liberalized to attract new flows.  The results 
of this paper imply either that the shortage of capital was not the problem, as in many 
countries of East Asia, or that the ability to absorb that capital was limited, particularly 
when faced with a rush of volatile flows.” 
 
The study does find a statistically significant positive effect of FDI on domestic 
investment, but one that weakened in the 1990s as the percentage of FDI directed at 
mergers and acquisitions rose from 6% in 1995 to 30% in 1998.  The degree of financial 
liberalization, however, had no statistically significant effect on either long-term  FDI or 
portfolio inflows.   
Similarly, Ales Bulir and Soojin Moon, in “Do IMF-Supported Programs Help 
Make Fiscal Adjustments more Durable?” [IMF Working Paper WP/03/38, February 
2003] answer the titled question negatively.  Their procedure is to compare the fiscal 
balance effects of 33 IMF “program countries” where the programs included structural 
adjustment conditions with those of 31 program countries without such conditions.  The 
programs of both groups of countries were operative during 1993-96.  The fiscal balance 
behavior during the same period of a third group of 48 “non-program countries” is used, 
along with other conditioning variables, to isolate exogenous cyclical and trend effects on 
the program outcomes.  The tests compare the average fiscal balances and the proportions 
due to revenue and expenditure changes three years after program termination for each 
group of countries.  The main findings (pp. 27-28): 
“Although the overall fiscal balance improved in most countries, the impact of 
IMF-supported programs was not statistically significant….The statistical insignificance 
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of IMF-supported programs indicates that program participation does not make the fiscal 
adjustment softer—on average program countries adjust as much as non-program 
countries.  In general, all fiscal variables were strongly influenced by the business cycle.” 
 
“In programs with structural conditionality, revenue declined slightly and 
expenditure declined significantly.  In contrast, in programs without structural 
conditionality, revenue remained stable and expenditure increased somewhat.” 
 
“We find some evidence that programs with too many structural conditions have 
worse results than those with fewer conditions (the ‘ownership’ nexus).  Second we find 
no quantitative evidence that structural conditionality aimed at raising revenue was 
successful.  Third, post-program expenditure compression clearly was much stronger in 
countries with structural conditionality, but risk of reversal was higher too.” 
 
The canonical IMF reassessment of the effect of financial globalization on the 
developing countries is a recent monograph by four senior IMF economists, including the 
IMF’s outgoing chief economist [Prasad et al. IMF March 17, 2003. 86 pp].  Its review of 
the evidence? 
1. “The main conclusions are that, so far, it has proven difficult to find robust 
evidence in support of the proposition that financial integration helps developing 
countries to improve growth and to reduce macroeconomic volatility.” (p.11) 
 
2. “There is little evidence that financial integration has helped developing countries 
to better stabilize fluctuations in consumption growth, notwithstanding the 
theoretically large benefits that could accrue to developing countries in this 
respect.  In fact new evidence presented in this paper suggests that low to 
moderate levels of financial integration may have made some countries subject to 
even greater volatility of consumption relative to that of output.  Thus while there 
is no evidence that financial globalization has benefited growth, there is evidence 
that some countries have experienced greater consumption volatility as a result.” 
(p.6) 
 
 Its policy suggestions, however, are minor adjustments of the IMF’s basic policy 
line.  Greater integration with the financial markets of the North should remain the basic 
orientation of developing country policy, though they will also need more “robust legal 
and supervisory frameworks, low levels of corruption, high degree of transparency and 
good corporate governance” to increase the benefits from, and control the risk of, 
globalization.” (p.6)  How to accomplish this? 
 “The review of the available evidence does not…provide a clear road map for 
countries that have started or desire to start on the path to financial integration.  For 
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instance, there is unresolved tension between having good institutions in place before 
capital market liberalization and the notion that such liberalization itself can help import 
best practices and provide an impetus to improve domestic institutions.  Furthermore, 
neither theory nor empirical evidence has provided clear-cut general answers to related 
issues such as the desirability and efficacy of selective capital controls.” (pp. 6-7) 
 
Therefore, 
 
“…there may be value for developing countries to experiment with different paces and 
strategies for pursuing financial integration….It might not be essential for a country to 
develop a full set of sound institutions matching the best practices in the world before 
embarking on financial integration….An intermediate and more practical approach could 
be to focus on making progress [toward]…transparency, control of corruption, rule of 
law, and financial supervisory capacity.” (p. 58) 
 
 In sum, the policy reassessment is rather a damp squib.  It advises the IMF to ease 
up on its structural adjustment demands, but ignores a more pressing conundrum 
afflicting IMF policy.   The capital flows to developing countries, and the macro policies 
that the IMF demands of debtor countries in order to sustain debt servicing, are both 
strongly pro-cyclical.  Do the higher interest rates and the fiscal austerity demanded by 
the IMF induce a faster return of foreign capital, or do they deter the revival of foreign 
capital inflows by deepening and prolonging the domestic depression?  The heated 
conviction that the latter is the case has become the main motivator of the rapid rise of 
popular anti-IMF fervor in the developing countries.  To extend a U.S. political cliché: 
it’s the economy, stupid, not lack of policy ownership per se.  But reverting the IMF from 
its current function of protecting financial globalization to its original task under its 
charter, the Articles of Agreement, of facilitating full employment growth of its 
members, requires power shifts or ideological changes among the IMF’s political 
overseers, the owners of its policy-making.  That’s beyond the powers of the IMF 
bureaucracy to effect, or even to discuss openly. 
 
A. Theoretical Confusion at the IMF  
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 IMF theorizing about financial globalization and its current problems appears now 
to be riding two horses in opposite policy directions.  IMF policy advice to developing 
countries still rests on the thesis that liberated financial markets can consistently price 
capital assets correctly in line with future supply and demand trends of the economy (i.e., 
“the fundamentals”) and that the asset pricing, therefore, provides a reliable welfare 
improving guide to private saving and investment decisions in decentralized market 
economies. Call it the Efficient Market Hypothesis writ-large, or EMH+.  The current 
policy head-scratching concerns merely how fast to liberalize and to elevate the domestic 
institutional environment to the level of “transparency, control of corruption, rule of law, 
and financial supervisory capacity” characterizing “the best practices of the world,” 
where presumably the EMH+ already rules.  But a different perspective is seeping into 
recent IMF Global Financial Development Reports, working papers that explore balance 
sheet deterioration as a crisis precursor [e.g, Keller et al, 2002] and house efforts 
(unsuccessful thus far) to devise workable early crisis warning models (briefly described 
in Mulder, 2002).  This perspective resembles Keynes on financial markets, which helped 
shape the approval of capital controls in the Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement 
(notably, Article VI) and which forms the core of the research program of the Post-
Keynesian school.  It is that liberated financial markets are inherently prone to 
endogenously generate destabilizing dynamics that will lead to crises with adverse 
repercussions on aggregate output and employment, and need, therefore, to be held in 
check with countervailing policies.   
 Why the infiltration of theoretical heresy?  Presumably because IMF economists 
are recognizing that the heresies are far better grounded in real world behavior of 
economic agents under uncertainty than the fanciful micro-foundations anchoring the 
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EMH+, and provide therefore more useful theoretical insights for analyzing the crises 
that are plaguing financial globalization.  A brief comparison may explain why. 
 The EMH+ takes off from the assumption that capital markets are in almost all 
essentials like all other markets in the neoclassical paradigm.  They are populated by 
equally well-informed maximizing agents who exchange at market-clearing prices that 
accurately reflect this information and the maximizing choices of each agent given her 
available resources.  To be sure capital markets involve the exchange of claims today on 
the expected returns from assets that only start paying off tomorrow and the days after.  
But while it is too much of a stretch to assume that today’s information about tomorrow 
is complete, it is OK to assume that the capital market agents know today the stochastic 
probability distributions of the future cash flows from capital assets and collectively price 
the present value of these assets accordingly.   
 Armed with the EMH+, anti-Keynesian economists embarked in the 1960s on an 
ambitious research program to refute Keynesian theorizing in all its varied forms.  
Rational Expectations (dubbed Ratex for short) showed that market agents equipped with 
accurate knowledge of future probabilities would render impotent counter-cyclical macro 
policies to smooth saving and investment volatility.  The Real Business Cycle school 
embarked on demonstrating that the business cycle was not generated endogenously by 
market dynamics, but by exogenous shocks, primarily from new technologies, that 
temporarily destabilize the economy as they move productive forces in real time to higher 
equilibrium output paths.  As it became evident in the 1970s that exchange rates had 
become quite volatile, and that cross currency trading in assets rather than in 
commodities had become the dominant determinant of exchange rate movements, the 
EMH+ was used to develop “news models” of exchange rate determination.  These were 
intended to show that the volatility merely reflected the speed with which traders in the 
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liberated exchange markets are able to move the exchange rate to its new equilibrium 
value each time new information about fundamentals required it.  
 Methodologically, however, the research program has, in Lakatosian terms, been 
“degenerate.”17  It tries  to protect its core belief in the optimality of real world markets 
by illegitimately shrinking the explanatory scope of the “protective belt” of other 
auxiliary propositions developed with the same intent.  In making technical change 
exogenous, the Real Business Cycle School simply discards as inconvenient rather than 
disproved the earlier post-war literature on factor market-guided technical change that 
inhabits the same protective belt surrounding the core paradigm.  The “representative 
agent” simplification, which has been the hallmark of asset market modeling grounded in 
the EMH+, conveniently avoids the complications of asymmetric information, but can’t 
explain why market agents holding identically optimal portfolios at each moment, would 
have any motive for trading with each other—a serious defect of models intended to 
explain asset trading dynamics.  The analytic modeling has thus produced professional 
in-jokes rather than insights, while the econometric versions have performed very poorly 
as out-of-sample predictors..  
 Completing the critique is the falsity of the claim that the EMH+ is a logical 
corollary of the mathematical proofs that competitive multi-market economies can 
produce vectors of simultaneously market clearing prices and quantities.  Except for the 
Arrow-Debreu model, these proofs merely establish alternative sufficiency conditions for 
the existence of local equilibriums.  That is, markets reach equilibrium and bounce back 
to it if subjected to limited disturbances, but beyond these limits equilibrium breaks 
down.  This is a structuralist, not a laissez-faire, conclusion, expressed in higher math.  
                                                 
17 The reference is to Imre Lakatos’s modification of Thomas Kuhn’s  paradigm-shift approach to scientific 
epistemology. [Lakatos and Musgrave 1970]. 
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Moreover, the proofs have nothing to say about equilibrium in financial markets, since 
they do not assign a role to money as a store of value.   
 The Arrow-Debreu proof establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of general competitive equilibrium that does address inter-temporal exchange, 
but with conditions that are unattainable in a real world capitalist economy.  The A-D 
proof requires a complete set of futures markets to exist, or to form as needed, that allow 
investors to insure their inter-temporal positions against all possible adverse 
contingencies.  That eliminates uncertainty, but also transforms the capitalist 
entrepreneur, the bearer of uninsurable risk, into an accountant able to convert his risky 
positions into sure bets.  And since an appropriate timing of payments and receipts 
eliminates the need to hold assets for their liquidity, wealth maximizing agents would not 
hold money, a zero earning asset.18 Nor would fully insured entrepreneurs need to protect 
their wealth by overseeing production.  Hence as self-interested consumers valuing 
leisure over work, they would head for the golf course instead of the office.  In short, 
realization of the complete futures markets condition is blocked by an insoluble moral 
hazard barrier.  The Arrow-Debreu model is thus a reductio ad absurdum disproof that a 
laissez-faire economy can move along a stable growth path, and that investor uncertainty 
can be contained in reliable probability distributions, as the EMH+ assumes [Cf. Arrow 
and Hahn 1991; Chapter 14].   
 The inference of the A-D disproof is also that there is no sound theoretical basis 
for the IMF’s contention that combining gradual liberalization with institutional reforms 
that bring “transparency, control of corruption, rule of law and financial supervisory 
capacity” to the levels characterizing the “best practices of the world,” will allow 
developing countries to absorb foreign capital flows beneficially.  It takes two to tango, 
                                                 
18 Yet “in a world with a past as well as a future and in which contracts are made in terms of money, no 
equilibrium may exist.” [Arrow and Hahn 1991; p.361]. 
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and full liberalizing—capital decontrol and all—gives maximum scope to the financial 
markets of each partner to misstep.  Putting the onus on the developing countries to do all 
the adjusting is biased policy when the financial markets of the developed economies are 
responsible for much of the stumbling. 
 The alternative post-Keynesian perspective focuses primarily on financial 
instability in capitalist economies with mature financial sectors.  The micro-foundations 
driving its dynamic analysis are twofold.  Individual position-taking in a competitive 
capitalist economy is clouded by radical uncertainty about future cash flows, and market 
competition forces rational agents to include changing market “sentiment” as well as 
changing “news” about fundamentals in their calculations.  More specifically, in a 
continually changing capitalist economy probability distributions of future cash flows 
that convert uncertainty into reliable risk assessments do not exist.  And fear of losing 
market share deters firms and banks from sticking with cautious liability strategies, if 
their competitors are gaining from more risky debt leveraging.   
 The late Hyman Minsky, a leading post-Keynesian, combined these 
microfoundations with elements from Keynes, Kalecki, Marx, Schumpeter, and the pre-
WW II Chicago School, to advance two general propositions in his increasingly 
influential Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH).  The first proposition, that the well-
developed financial markets of modern capitalist economies are inherently crisis-prone, 
may now be reaching receptive ears among IMF analysts.  The second proposition, that 
crisis minimizing requires preemptive monetary policy surprises, and “big government” 
rather than rolling back the state, is still forbidden territory, given the ideological 
predilection of the current owners of IMF policy; hence the wishy-washy reaffirmations 
of that general policy line with which IMF analysts conclude their critical reports. 
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 The first proposition asserts that a state of financial tranquility—the ubiquity in 
the economy of banks and firms with strong balance sheets and cautious liability 
management—produces the seeds of its destruction by lowering assessments of credit 
risk.  Banks and related financial institutions begin exploiting more intensely the interest 
arbitraging opportunities offered by the upward-sloping yield curve.  They expand their 
privileged access to low cost liquidity in order to lend more long-term, and resort to 
financial innovations to evade regulatory constraints on their liability leveraging and 
maturity mismatching.  Concurrently, non-financial firms take advantage of the increased 
availability of long term credit to increase debt financing of new and existing products 
and production processes.  Loan pushing interacting with debt leveraging generates a 
surge of investment and output, encouraging the capital markets to hike up asset values. 
These collateralize higher levels of debt and add an augmented risk of hostile takeover to 
the fear of loss of market share to impel cautious firms to join the debt leveraging.  The 
ballooning of debt commitments renders the financial system increasingly vulnerable to 
the risk that interruptions in the flow of funds between debtors and creditors will spiral 
into a systemic payments crisis with adverse repercussions on output and employment.  
Various endogenous shocks can set off the interrupted payments spiral: capacity 
overbuilding in the production sector; credit crunches, i.e., abrupt hardening of 
refinancing terms; the collapse of asset price bubbles, etc.  The timing of the shock, 
whether it hits the financial system when the bulk of individual balance sheets are still 
robust or when they have become fragile, determines whether the financial system will 
self-adjust or spiral into a crisis.  And in an extreme case, such as the 1929-33 Great 
Depression, spiraling asset and debt deflation, combined with severe downward wage-
price spiraling and rapidly declining aggregate demand, can push the entire economy into 
a near death spiral.   
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 Minsky’s policy propositions derive from this range of possible crisis outcomes.  
“Thwarting Mechanisms,” preemptive “policy surprises” by the monetary authorities, are 
intended to curb overly optimistic risk/return expectations before they get fully embodied 
in dangerous debt and asset bubbles.  But thwarting mechanisms lose effectiveness as 
market agents learn to innovate around the new constraints, so they require periodic 
revision or replacement.  From the FIH perspective, neither government policies nor 
market processes of capitalist economies can produce stable equilibrium growth paths.  
What interventionist policies can do is dampen the volatility of market processes by 
timely interventions [Ferri and Minsky 1992].  The thwarting mechanism concept takes 
to a higher level the aphorism, popular among conservative central bankers of the post-
war Golden Age, that their job is to remove the punchbowl when the party really gets 
going.  It is thus subject to the riposte then and now from anti-policy-surprise economists 
that this assumes government bureaucrats have more accurate information about future 
returns than market agents.  But the riposte misses the essential point.  At issue is not 
difference in knowledge but difference in objective function.  Market agents are 
constrained to pursue individual goals—greater profit and wealth.  Central bankers and 
other economic bureaucrats are supposed to pursue collective goals, such as more stable 
economic growth.   
 Similarly, the contrast between the Great Depression and the moderateness thus 
far of post-WW II business cycles in the industrialized countries motivated Minsky’s 
proposition that “Big Government” is an important bulwark against a reprise of a Great 
Depression-scale disaster.  “Big Government” means the central government’s 
expenditures are a large enough share of GDP and its revenue structure sufficiently 
progressive to produce automatic stabilizers large enough to dampen significantly the 
cyclical fluctuations of aggregate demand.  The Great Depression culminated an era of 
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“small government” with regressive tax structures.  Automatic stabilizers were then 
lacking to even partly offset the impact on aggregate demand of the pro-cyclical fiscal 
efforts by which governments sought initially to avert the financial spiraling.  On the 
other hand, war financing, and the post-WW II ideological shifts that produced the 
welfare state, progressive taxation and the acceptance of active counter-cyclical policies, 
also produced strong automatic stabilizers, while easing the need to precisely time the 
active policies. 
 Minsky developed the FIH in a closed economy context, but it can easily and 
fruitfully be extended to open economies and globalized finance.  Required, as Arestis 
and Glickman show, is adding exchange rate risk to Minsky’s focus on credit risk. 
[Arestis and Glickman 1999].  Exchange rate risk alters Minsky’s tri-partite typology of 
financing units.  Hedge financing units, firms that borrow with the expectation that their 
future cash flows will be able to fully pay off principal as well as interest without cutting 
into working capital, are the backbone of the financial tranquility phase in Minsky’s 
version of the FIH.  But if the same debt is borrowed in a different currency from their 
revenue they become de facto speculative units, since they risk having to roll over rather 
than pay off principal, should the exchange rate depreciate.  Speculative units, firms that 
debt leverage to where they expect to fully service the interest on the debt but to have to 
roll over the principal, drive the expansionary phase of the FIH in its closed economy 
version.  In that version, An upsurge of rollover interest costs or diminution of cash flow 
can convert them into Ponzi units, requiring expanding debt to meet the interest service 
as well as to and roll over the principal on existing debt; i.e., they become technically 
insolvent.  Their numbers are increased by endogenous shocks as the FIH reaches its 
crisis phase.  In the open economy FIH, speculative units that borrow in a different 
currency from their revenue are dubbed “super speculative” by Arestis and Glickman, 
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since exchange rate depreciation as well as credit tightening can transform them into 
Ponzi units.  Moreover, governments who borrow in currencies other than the one they 
can print and collect taxes are also “super-speculative” units.  In all, its dynamics are 
likely to move the FIH to a crisis phase faster in open than closed economies. 
 
V. Inferences of the FIH for Development Policy and for Stabilizing Financial 
Globalization 
 
 The FIH reverses the causal implications of the frequently cited correlation 
between financial deepening and economic development.  Broadening and deepening the 
economy’s productive capacity pulls financial deepening along, rather than the reverse.  
That is, the dynamics of the FIH include Tobin’s Q relation, in which the physical 
investment rate gets pulled up as the booming equity markets bid up the capital value of 
existing firms above their replacement cost.  But in open economies, the degree to which 
the equity boom will generate a boom in domestic intermediate and capital goods 
industries, and a strong multiplier impact on domestic aggregate demand, depends on the 
size, depth, and technological sophistication of the existing industrial structure.  
Industrialized economies equipped with such structures now have financial sectors that 
have deepened by servicing the long-term financing needs of their deepening industrial 
structures, and are able to fund in domestic currency most of the boom in goods 
production.   By contrast, in developing economies with liberalized and privatized 
financial institutions but shallow industrial structures, the equity boom mainly generates a 
surging demand for capital and intermediate goods imports, and for the foreign exchange 
to fund the purchases.  Domestic banks typically supply most of the foreign exchange to 
the final purchasers by borrowing abroad to onlend at home, profiting from the interest 
spread.  The result is a weaker multiplier impact on domestic aggregate demand, and a 
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strong association of financial liberalization with frequent “twin” currency and banking 
crises that severely depress output and employment and deter financial deepening 
[Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996].   
 Thus, the FIH and the evidence to date refute the neo-liberal claim that building 
up the financial sector through financial liberalization is the most effective financial 
strategy for promoting the long-term economic growth of developing countries.  Rather, 
using financial policy to reduce the vulnerability of economic growth to external 
blockages by facilitating the broadening and deepening of the productive structure should 
take precedence over financial liberalization.  Of current neo-liberal modifications of 
earlier enthusiasm for financial liberalization, such as liberalizing in step with building up 
human capital, learning from past mistakes, and liberalizing the production sector,19 the 
first two requirements change little.  The buildup of human capital and learning from past 
mistakes could as well improve the use of the financial instruments, such as capital 
controls, official development banks, and financial subsidies and restrictions, that 
industrial strategies rely on to help channel resources to priority areas.  
 However, the advice to keep liberalizing the financial sector in step with further 
liberalizing of the production sector, does indeed differ from reinstituting industrial 
strategies and their financial controls as a response to the poor performance and rising 
discontent with neo-liberalism as a development strategy.  To be sure, since few if any 
developing countries have as yet fully liberalized, defenders can blame the poor 
performance of neo-liberalism on incomplete implementation rather than basic analytic 
flaws.  But as the IMF reports cited above admit, the IMF hasn’t a clue as to whether this 
means speeding up or slowing down the liberalization process, which empties both the 
defense and the gradualism advice of substance.   
                                                 
19 See the advice to Latin America of IMF Deputy Managing Director Eduardo Aninat at Chilean and 
Peruvian seminars, IMF Financial Survey March 3, 2003. 
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 What remains is the belief that the globalized financial markets will also learn 
from past misbehavior, and become as time goes on more stable suppliers of international 
finance, thus creating a progressively safer global environment to facilitate the efforts of 
developing countries to liberalize further.  The FIH shares the first part of this belief, but 
not the second.  Financial innovation and risk reassessment are ongoing processes, but 
they need not bring financial stability closer, according to the FIH.  Rather they are 
essential components of the financial dynamics that, unless checked by countervailing 
policies, will continue to move capitalist financial systems recurrently from robustness to 
fragility.  To illustrate: 
 In reaction to the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the Basel Committee of 
central bankers from the major industrial countries reached an accord in 1988, now 
dubbed Basel 1, intended to reduce risky loan pushing by banks.  Basel 1 divided bank 
lending into rising credit-risk classes, and set higher compulsory equity capital to loan 
ratios for the riskier loan classes.  But as the central banks began implementing the 
requirements on banks under their jurisdiction, the banks began gaming the new 
restrictions. 
   The gaming has taken four major forms, two merely involving altered lending 
strategies and two requiring financial innovating.  The altered lending strategies sharply 
increased inter-bank loans and short-term lending to developing countries, each of which 
were in lower risk classes than were long-term loans, as shares of total assets on the 
bank’s balance sheet.  Much of the explosion of inter-bank lending was applied to 
covered interest rate arbitraging, but part of it financed the expansion of open speculation 
on exchange rate movements and interest rate spreads by bank clients and by the banks 
themselves.  The fast growth of short-term lending to developing countries went mostly 
to local banks for domestic onlending.  In East Asian countries it financed the 
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overleveraging of industrial investment and the real estate bubbles that led to the 1997 
financial crises.  Not surprisingly, IMF analysts, still bemused then by the EMH+, gave a 
green light to these trends in their pre-crisis reports, and when the crises broke, the IMF 
conditioned the bailout credits on sharp increases of domestic interest rates to re-attract 
the fleeing foreign bank lenders.  The interest increases instead produced waves of 
domestic bankruptcies that overwhelmed the local banks with bad loans, setting off 
massive credit crunches that intensified the decline of output and employment  That also 
intensified rioting in the streets, forcing the IMF to countermand its austerity orders and  
acquiesce instead to expansionary monetary-fiscal measures to turn things around.  
Today, the IMF warns developing countries against loading up heavily with short-term 
foreign debt, and approves the deposit requirements that Chile has used to control hot 
money inflows.  But controls on capital outflows are still off its formulary. 
 The two major bank innovations, securitization and customized derivative 
mongering, were intended to profit from off-balance sheet lending activities that were 
exempt from equity capital requirements.  Securitization meant booking long-term loans 
that could be quickly converted and resold as bonds collateralized by the stream of 
interest payments and/or other cash flow commitments of the original loans, with the 
banks setting the initial bond price to yield them a moderate one-time profit.  Derivative 
mongering meant devising and selling “over the counter” (OTC) customized interest, 
commodity and exchange rate derivatives for a fee to corporations and hedge funds 
seeking cheaper ways to hedge against various perceived risks from their operations.  To 
generate high returns on equity, both innovations require large volume and rapid turnover 
of bank funds.  Hence the large international banks that dominated the innovations had by 
the late 1990s pushed the value of the global stock of securitized bonds to multi-trillion 
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dollars, while the notional value of the global stock of OTC derivatives reached a 
staggering $99.7 trillion in June 2001 [BIS 2001; p. 23]. 
 The ballooning of global financial transactions relative to the growth of 
production and trade of non-financial products also increased the volume and variety of 
financial risks.  Basel 1 had concerned itself merely with credit risk.  But the wholesale 
conversion of long-term bank loans into securitized bonds, which enabled the initiating 
banks to pass on the credit risk to the bond holders, also inflicted market risk on the 
holders--the risk that falling bond prices due to an increase in interest rates or in default 
risk might substantially depreciate the value of their assets.20  The huge volume of OTC 
derivative transactions and of inter-bank lending augment settlement risk--the risk to 
participating banks that their transaction counterparties might renege on payment 
commitments.  The systemic repercussions of settlement risk are further augmented 
because OTC derivative mongering and inter-bank lending are concentrated globally in a 
few dozen very large banks who typically engage in very sizeable transactions.   
 In reaction to the gaming of Basel 1 and the accumulation of financial risks with 
systemic repercussions, the Basel Committee decided in the mid-1990s to devise an 
updated risk control accord, dubbed Basel 2.  The effort has focused on supplementing 
pre-defined risk classes, with market risk assessments by bond rating agencies such as 
Moody and Standard and Poor, and in-house risk control systems of the large banks.  
Reaching agreement on details, has, however, been a prolonged process.  Basel 2 is now 
supposed to be finalized this year (2003), and to go into full operation in 2007.  Can it 
stabilize the globalized financial markets?  An insightful analysis by two Deutsche Bank 
                                                 
20 This is being brought home big time by the recent collapse of the IT and telecommunication bubbles, 
which has wiped out an estimated $3 trillion of bond market values, much of it securitized bonds. The main 
holders affected have been U.S. and European pension funds and insurance companies, leaving many of 
them underfunded relative to their expected payout commitments.  Higher insurance rates and risk of 
breaks in payouts are part of the asset and debt deflation process currently depressing private profits and 
investment in the U.S. and the EU.  
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economists [Folkerts-Landau and Garber 1998] concludes with a resounding no.  The 
effect of adding the additional risk control methods might well be to increase global 
volatility and contagion.  To quote the authors: 
 “A downgrade of a country’s credit rating leads to an immediate sell-off of its 
bonds and an inability to approach the market for more funding.  Risk control systems 
require that margin calls in foreign exchange be made on domestic counterparties whose 
derivative positions…take losses from market price movements.  A volatility event in one 
country automatically will generate an upward re-estimate of credit and market risk in a 
correlated country, triggering automatic margin calls and tightening of credit 
lines….These are not the responses of panicked green-screen traders arbitrarily driving 
economies from a good to a bad equilibrium.  Rather they work with relentless 
predictability and under the seal of approval of supervisors in the main financial centers. 
‘Contagion’ is the other side of the coin of risk control in the industrial countries.” 
 
 A case for reintroducing capital controls?  Not for the authors. To quote again 
from their analysis: 
 “Modern risk control methods pushed heavily by the BIS and national regulatory 
authorities are liquidity hungry.  They trigger heavy demands for cash, collateral, and 
capital on a systemic level when asset prices move significantly.  Such methods have 
now created a clear tension between the thrust of prudential regulation of industrial 
country supervisors and the lender of last resort responsibility of G-7 authorities.” 
  
 “Credit and currency control events are poison for such systems of risk 
management.  These break the netting and hedging vision under which most traders and 
risk managers work.  If funds cannot be moved across borders easily or if a piece of a 
portfolio defaults, then risk control methods fall apart.  Positions must be regarded from a 
gross not a net basis, with considerably higher capital costs than may be justified by the 
risk-return tradeoff of a given security.” 
 
 In sum, the analysis depicts the international financial markets as implacably 
unstable, but beyond public control.  Can anything be done?  In 1999 Congressional 
testimony, Folkerts-Landau, former high-level IMF apparatchik and now Managing 
Director and Global Head of Research of the Deutsche Bank, gave his harsh policy 
advice.21  Do not try to change the behavior of the international financial markets, but 
strengthen instead the power of the IMF to force developing countries to accept the 
disciplining of the financial markets.  
                                                 
21  Hearings on the Architecture of International Finance of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Banking and Financial Services, May 20, 1999. 
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 “More concretely, after improving its surveillance capability the Fund will need to 
go public with its findings and let the markets do the rest.  It will need to pressure 
countries publicly for policy changes, including international sanctions, aid curtailment, 
the imposition of additional capital requirements on bank lending to countries identified 
as following destabilizing policies, and ultimately declaring countries ineligible for 
access to the Fund’s lending facilities—it is astonishing that this has never happened.” 
   
 The analysis passes over the likelihood that banks will adapt their risk controls to 
changes in the global regulatory environment.  And Folkerts-Landau’s testimony merely 
demonstrated his own lousy surveillance capability, when he illustrated his case by 
lauding Argentina as one of the few developing countries with “the necessary economic 
policy discipline” for sustainimg “access to large inflows of foreign capital.”   
 However, the basic message of his analysis, that strengthening prudential 
supervision of the financial center banks will not stabilize financial globalization is valid, 
even if his policy conclusion is neither adequate nor moral.  It is inadequate because the 
vast bulk of global financial transacting is between the industrial countries.  Forcing 
developing countries to absorb the instability of their small share of global transacting 
touches merely the fringes of the global instability problem.  It is immoral because it 
imposes the entire adjustment burden of that unstable share on the weaker and poorer 
partner.  The current worries that a replay of the Great Depression could be in the offing 
emphasize discordant fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies among the U.S., the 
E.U. and Japan, as well as the ease with which the liberated and excessively liquid global 
financial markets react to thwart efforts at policy adjustment.  Both features have a late 
1920s aura.  The renewed interest in capital control mechanisms thus arises from 
recognition that they are a prerequisite for effecting improved policy coordination 
between the Big Three as well as for allowing developing countries to pursue counter-
cyclical stabilization and industrial development strategies.   
 The IMF in its current lending has been backing away from the policy direction 
advocated by Folkerts-Landau.  The terms of the new rollover of its Argentine loans, 
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which largely acquiesce to the Argentine government’s demand that it be allowed to 
finance economic recovery before renewing its dollar debt payments, has upset the 
international financial markets, not least because it may presage a general weakening of 
the IMF’s role of debt payment enforcer.  Yet capital controls, even “market-friendly” 
ones like the Tobin tax , not only remain off the IMF’s policy agenda, but remain too hot 
a topic for honest public appraisal by its analysts.  The latter is evidenced by a recent 
piece by Kenneth Rogoff, the IMF’s outgoing Economic Counsellor and Director of 
Research. (“Rethinking Capital Controls,” Finance & Development, December, 2002).  
In a single paragraph, Rogoff, who surely knows better, dismisses the Tobin tax concept 
by falsely accusing Tobin of having been motivated by the belief that “all short-term 
flows are bad,” and by falsely claiming that the tax “would discriminate indiscriminately 
against all short-term flows,” including trade credits, “the life blood of all trade.”  The 
latter assertion is precisely the opposite of the objective of the tax and of its practical 
effect, since its proposed small globally uniform tax on all exchange transactions would 
impose a smaller relative tax burden on transactions involving longer round trips, like 
trade credits, than on the short-term round tripping characteristic of arbitrage and 
speculative exchange transactions.22 
 This suggests a two-pronged approach to render alternative development 
strategies to neo-liberalism more feasible.  Give capital controls a prominent place in the 
development programming, as a pre-requisite for implementing counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies as well as counter-free market industrialization programs.  But 
concurrently, urge developing country governments to demand that serious consideration 
                                                 
22  Earlier published IMF critiques of the Tobin tax were misguided, but not deceitful.  The gist of those 
critiques was that if the international financial system was always in full equilibrium, the Tobin tax would 
necessarily be introducing a welfare-reducing “distortion.”  If one believed in the EMH+, as apparently 
many IMF economists did back then, the analysis was at least intellectually honest, if worthless.  Rogoff’s 
dismissal, on the other hand, merely reflects an arrogant disregard of the voluminous published literature on 
the tax and its feasibility.  
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be given to proposals for thwarting measures by the major industrial country blocs to 
stabilize financial globalization and for macro-policy coordination to stabilize global 
aggregate demand.  Were that to strengthen the political clout of such proposals 
sufficiently to allow collective rationality to triumph over the current ideological and 
narrow self-interest barriers blocking adoption, it would be short-cut return to the humane 
global vision of the early Bretton Woods era.  Were it to fall short, the first prong would 
still leave developing countries better equipped to ride out a reprise of the stormy 1930s 
that led to Bretton Woods.  
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